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Internal Realism, Religious Pluralism and Ontology 
 
 
I 
 
Internalist pluralism seeks to provide a theoretical account of religious diversity;
1
 as 
such it is a version of religious pluralism. Specifically, it has been advanced as an 
alternative to transcendental religious pluralism, which is the form of pluralism 
famously advocated by John Hick.
2
 Despite the many appealing features of internalist 
pluralism, its viability as an alternative to rival theories of pluralism will depend upon 
how successfully it can respond to criticism. 
In this article I defend internalist pluralism against two possible, yet seemingly 
contradictory, criticisms to which the theory, at first sight, can appear vulnerable. The 
first objection claims that the resulting analysis of religious belief systems is 
intrinsically atheistic. The second objection claims that the analysis is unsatisfactory 
because it involves simply defining into existence various religious objects. (In other 
words, the critic of internalist pluralism charges that important ontological questions 
are decided by definitional fiat.) Interestingly, it is those of a religious persuasion who 
often presume that internalist pluralism is inherently atheistic; whereas it is those who 
are inclined towards atheism who tend to presume that internalist pluralism simply 
defines Gods and other purported religious entities into existence. I suspect that one 
reason for this is that both religious believers and atheists tend to take metaphysical 
realism for granted. But internalist pluralism seemingly leaves one, at best, with an 
internally real God, which appears to be ontologically less substantial than the 
metaphysically real God that many believers think they need; while atheists, holding 
that—in metaphysically realist terms—the world is devoid of any God, find any talk 
of an internally real God unacceptable. 
                                                
1
For a detailed exposition of internalist pluralism, see Victoria S. Harrison, “Internal Realism and the 
Problem of Religious Diversity”, Philosophia 34, 3 (2006): 287–301.  
2
For the most sophisticated account of Hickean transcendental pluralism, see John Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (London: Macmillan, 1989). 
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In what follows, I demonstrate that a subscriber to internalist pluralism can deflect 
both objections, and in the course of so arguing, I deploy a distinction between the 
“conceptual-scheme targetable” and the “successfully conceptual-scheme targeted”. 
 
II 
 
What, then, more precisely, is internalist pluralism? It is an adaptation to the religious 
domain of internal realism—a theory first advanced by Hilary Putnam.
3
 Like the 
Putnamian internal realist, the adherent to internalist pluralism holds both that 
whichever objects can be said to exist is conceptual-scheme
4
 dependent and that 
whatever it means for an object to exist is equally conceptual-scheme dependent. 
Putnam gives the example of a world containing three atoms.
5
 A “Carnapian” sees a 
world of three objects, whereas a “Polish Logician”
6
 sees a world of seven objects 
(the atoms and the mereological sums of two or more atoms). Figure 1 represents a 
world of three atoms (let us call it “W1”) as seen by a “Carnapian”, and Figure 2 
represents a world of three atoms as seen by a “Polish Logician”, who also sees three 
pairs and a trio (the mereological sums of those three atoms). When a “Carnapian” 
claims that the world contains only three objects, a “Polish Logician” may well 
mistakenly conclude that the “Carnapian” believes that the world contains two atoms. 
For a “Polish Logician” would regard a world containing three objects as only 
comprising two atoms and one pair (the two atoms and their mereological sum). Let 
                                                
3
See, particularly, Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981) and Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face, edited by James Conant (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992, first published 1990). The purpose of this paper is not 
to elucidate Putnam’s views. Hence, here I appeal exclusively, although not exhaustively, to those 
aspects of his thought which seem particularly salient to the development of internalist pluralism. 
4
“Conceptual scheme” is a term of art within recent Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Most philosophers would 
agree that a conceptual scheme can be defined as the “general system of concepts with which we 
organize our thoughts and perceptions.” Simon Blackburn (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 72. 
5
See Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1992), p. 120. 
6
The “Polish Logician” is so called because of his debt to the language developed by the Polish 
logician, and founder of mereology, Stanislaw Lezniewski (1886–1939). 
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us call a world containing two atoms “W2”. If the “Carnapian” were to consider W2, 
however, he would claim that it contains only two objects. 
Conversely, upon hearing the “Polish Logician” declare that a world contains 
seven objects, the “Carnapian” might mistakenly conclude that the “Polish Logician” 
believes that world to contain seven atoms. Let us call a world containing seven atoms 
“W3”. Clearly, what the “Carnapian” and the “Polish Logician” disagree about is 
what is to be counted as an “object”. And according to internal realism, what is to be 
counted as an object is conceptual-scheme dependent. The problem is that the 
“Carnapian” and the “Polish Logician” think within different conceptual schemes. 
And this can lead to the “Carnapian” mistakenly thinking that the “Polish Logician” is 
wrongly describing the world as if it were W3, and to the “Polish Logician” 
mistakenly thinking that the “Carnapian” is wrongly describing the world as if it were 
W2. 
According to internal realism, then, one’s choice of conceptual scheme determines 
what is to count as an object. But this must imply that one’s choice of conceptual 
scheme also determines what it is to count as existing. For according to the 
“Carnapian”, only three objects exist in W1; while according to the “Polish Logician”, 
within W1 seven objects exist. Hence, what it is to exist must be no less conceptual-
scheme dependent than what is to count as an object. But this doesn’t thereby turn W1 
into either W2 or W3. We could put the claim of conceptual-scheme dependence this 
way: the conceptual scheme of the “Carnapian” ensures that only atoms are in 
principle “targetable”; whereas the conceptual scheme of the “Polish Logician” makes 
both atoms and their mereological sums in principle “targetable”. But although one’s 
conceptual scheme determines what kind of entity is targetable, one’s conceptual 
scheme does not thereby on its own ensure that anything will actually be targeted. For 
even if both atoms and their mereological sums are targetable, there might be neither 
atoms nor mereological sums to target.
7
 Hence, conceptual-scheme dependence does 
not simply bring things into existence ex nihilo.
8
 
                                                
7
Put another way, one might say that whether or not an entity has been successfully targeted is a fact 
while whether or not an entity is targetable is a convention. Moreover, successful targeting is not 
entailed by mere targetability. 
8
Commenting on this example in a recent work, Putnam writes: “Saying that there are three objects in 
the universe of discourse Carnap was describing is a matter of fact, as opposed to saying that there are 
four objects in that universe, and a matter of convention, as opposed to describing the situation in 
 4
However, when one moves from the “Carnapian” conceptual scheme to the 
conceptual scheme of the “Polish Logician”, it might be thought that mereological 
sums are indeed brought into existence. But any such assumption is likely to be 
extremely misleading. For if one formerly subscribed to the conceptual scheme of the 
“Carnapian”, then in moving to the conceptual scheme of the “Polish Logician”, one 
does not bring into being mereological sums that exist in the way in which objects 
exist within the “Carnapian” conceptual scheme. Rather, one’s understanding of what 
it is to exist changes when one moves from the conceptual scheme of the “Carnapian” 
to that of the “Polish Logician”. Equally, if one had previously subscribed to the 
conceptual scheme of the “Polish Logician”, then in moving to the “Carnapian” 
conceptual scheme one does not extinguish mereological sums in terms of how they 
exist within the conceptual scheme of the “Polish Logician”. Again, it is rather that 
one’s understanding of what it is to exist might change when one moves from one 
conceptual scheme to the other.
9
 Hence, any assumption that one either brings objects 
into existence or extinguishes them as a result of switching conceptual schemes rests 
on an equivocation between two conceptions of existence. Because the conception of 
existence alters as one moves from the “Carnapian’s” to the “Polish Logician’s” 
conceptual scheme, one would be equivocating between two conceptions of existence 
if one were to assume that entities were either brought into existence or extinguished 
merely by virtue of one’s choice of conceptual scheme.
10
 Hence, there is clearly a 
                                                                                                                                       
Lezniewski’s language by saying that there are seven objects (counting the mereological sums as 
objects).” Hilary Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), p. 45. In other words, Putnam seems to be claiming that what is targetable is a matter of 
convention, while what is successfully targeted is a matter of fact. 
9
As Putnam explains: “to ask whether mereological sums really exist would be stupid. It is, in my view, 
a matter of convention whether we say that mereological sums exist or not. But what does this mean? 
How can the question whether something exists be a matter of convention? The answer, I suggest, is 
this: what logicians call ‘the existential quantifier,’ the symbol ‘(Ex),’ and its ordinary language 
counterparts, the expressions ‘there are,’ ‘there exist’ and ‘there exists a,’ ‘some,’ etc., do not have a 
single absolutely precise use but a whole family of uses.” And he continues, “there is nothing in the 
logic of existential and universal quantification to tell us whether we should say that mereological sums 
exist or don’t exist; not is there some other science that answers this question. I suggest that we can 
decide to say either”. Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology, ibid., pp. 37f. 
10
In other words, to use Eli Hirsch’s terminology, internal realism argues for “quantifier relativity”. See 
Eli Hirsch, Dividing Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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sense in which the “Polish Logician” does not create new entities to be counted 
simply by employing a particular conceptual scheme.
11
 That there are objects at all 
depends upon what is successfully targeted by one’s conceptual scheme. But which 
entities are targetable is wholly conceptual-scheme dependent.
12
 
To take an example from the religious domain, when one moves from a Theravada 
Buddhist conceptual scheme to the conceptual scheme of a Christian, it might be 
thought that certain entities are brought into existence. One would be moving from a 
conceptual scheme which did not recognize the existence of either a supreme God or 
any human selves, to one in which the existence of both God and selves was affirmed. 
However, according to internalist pluralism, if one formerly subscribed to the 
conceptual scheme of a Theravada Buddhist, then in moving to the conceptual scheme 
of a Christian, one does not bring into being either a God or selves. Rather, internalist 
pluralism suggests that one’s understanding of what it is to exist may well change 
when one moves from the conceptual scheme of a Theravada Buddhist to that of a 
Christian. Likewise, if one had previously subscribed to the conceptual scheme of a 
Christian, then in moving to a Theravada Buddhist conceptual scheme one does not 
extinguish either God or selves in terms of how they exist within the conceptual 
scheme of a Christian. Clearly, then, it would be mistaken to claim either that a 
Christian extinguishes entities in moving to a Theravada Buddhist conceptual scheme, 
or that a Theravadan creates entities to be counted simply by employing a Christian 
conceptual scheme. That there are selves and a God at all depends upon what is 
successfully targeted by one’s conceptual scheme. But whether or not selves and a 
                                                
11
Alternatively, imagine that the “Carnapian” and the “Polish Logician” inhabit a world with no sun, no 
moon, and only three stars, and that they are counting the objects in the sky. Although the “Polish 
Logician” counts more objects than the “Carnapian” does, it is not because he employs a conceptual 
scheme that has allowed him, for example, to create more stars. 
12
A critic might object that this amounts to another version of what Putnam disparagingly terms the 
Cookie Cutter Metaphor. Do we divide up the fundamental stuff of the world (the dough) according to 
what is targetable by our conceptual schemes? The answer to this seem to be no. As explained above, 
just because an entity is targetable within some conceptual scheme does not entail that it will be 
successfully targeted by users of that conceptual scheme. According to the Cookie Cutter Metaphor, the 
use of a particular cookie cutter determines that part of the dough will take its shape. However, the 
mere employment of a conceptual scheme in which an entity is targetable does not entail that the entity 
will be successfully targeted. 
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God are targetable is wholly conceptual-scheme dependent. A Theravada Buddhist 
conceptual scheme targets neither selves nor a God, whereas a Christian one does. 
The ability of internal realism to differentiate between conceptual-scheme 
targetability and successful conceptual-scheme targeting distinguishes it from 
subjective idealism—a theory that tends to portray everything as wholly and simply 
conceptual-scheme dependent. According to internal realism, a conceptual scheme 
determines what one will identify as an object. But it does not ensure that such objects 
are there to be found. In other words, merely employing a particular conceptual 
scheme is no guarantee that the objects the scheme tells us to count are there to be 
counted.
13
 With respect to the example of the Theravada Buddhist and the Christian, a 
subjective idealist would claim that the differences between them are conceptual-
scheme dependent. An internal realist would agree, but with one important 
qualification: whether there are any objects to be counted depends both on what one’s 
conceptual scheme renders targetable and also on what one can then successfully 
target. It is not simply a matter of everything being wholly conceptual-scheme 
dependent. 
Allow me to adapt another example of Putnam’s to illustrate the distinction 
between conceptual-scheme targetability and successful conceptual-scheme targeting. 
                                                
13
Allow me to adapt Alvin Plantinga’s example of the Great Pumpkin to illustrate this point. One may 
imagine a conceptual scheme that holds the ultimate religious entity to be a Great Pumpkin. A 
subjective idealist might claim that the world perceived by those subscribing to this conceptual scheme 
is such that a Great Pumpkin is the ultimate religious entity, and that statements about the Great 
Pumpkin are true in this conceptual scheme. Plantinga’s example was, of course, advanced as a 
reductio ad absurdum of such a conclusion. Plantinga believes that something has gone awry with a 
theory that commits us to taking beliefs about a Great Pumpkin seriously. It would seem, however, that 
internal realism can provide an analysis of conceptual schemes that avoids Plantinga’s reductio. 
According to internal realism, the fact that some community subscribes to a conceptual scheme that 
holds the ultimate religious entity to be a Great Pumpkin does not make it the case that there must be a 
Great Pumpkin to which the claims of the members of the community successfully refer. Rather, given 
what the members of the community mean by “Great Pumpkin”, and given what they mean by 
“ultimate religious entity”, if there is such a Great Pumpkin, and if it is the ultimate religious entity, 
then the claims of those employing this conceptual scheme could be true. But the fact that some 
community employs this conceptual scheme does not automatically make their claims true, nor does it 
define the Great Pumpkin into existence. See Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God”, Faith and 
Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
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Consider a world in which there are three large plants. One person may employ a 
conceptual scheme that draws no distinction between elms and beeches (for him, all 
trees are just trees). Thus he would see a world containing three trees, which he 
regards as large plants. But another person may employ a conceptual scheme that does 
distinguish between elms and beeches, both of which being regarded by her as large 
plants. She would see a world containing, for example, one elm and two beeches. The 
question of whether, along with the first person, we subscribe to a conceptual scheme 
that just identifies trees or, along with the second person, we subscribe to a conceptual 
scheme that identifies elms and beeches is quite distinct from the question of whether 
or not there are any large plants. The latter is, in this example, not simply conceptual-
scheme dependent in the way in which the question of whether there are just trees or 
whether there are elms and beeches is wholly a matter of the choice of conceptual 
scheme.
14
  
 
 
III 
 
The fact that we can talk about such examples suggests that it is possible to learn to 
employ a new conceptual scheme
15
—an implication that can be regarded as consistent 
with the phenomenon of conversion to a religion.
16
 Allow me to use another example 
to illustrate this point: Consider the fish charts that are available to help anglers and 
other interested parties learn to identify different species of fish. When the novice 
examines a fish chart, a common reaction is to declare that none of the catch matches 
any of the fish on the chart. However, with practice, and after having acquired a 
sufficient amount of relevant angling experience, a person can learn how to use the 
fish chart to identify fish. The fish have not changed, but the individual’s perception 
of them has. The fish are now seen as instances of the species of fish identified by the 
chart. After acquiring the conceptual scheme represented by the fish chart, the 
                                                
14
This is not to suggest, however, that it will always be an easy matter to determine whether or not any 
particular issue is wholly a conceptual-scheme dependent one. 
15
It also suggests that we can choose to discard a conceptual scheme that we had previously employed. 
16
Conversion from one religious conceptual scheme to another is very difficult to explain if one accepts 
John Hick’s transcendental form of religious pluralism. It is equally problematic for religious 
exclusivists, such as Alvin Plantinga, as well as for religious inclusivists. 
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individual has no difficulty, when she pulls a fish out of the water, in correctly 
declaring “It’s a trout” or “It’s a carp”.
17
 
Consider an example of a difference that an internal realist would regard as wholly 
conceptual-scheme dependent: C subscribes to a particular form of Christian 
conceptual scheme and sees her fellow humans as belonging to one of two mutually 
exclusive categories: the damned or the saved. Contrast C with M, who subscribes to a 
secular, ethical conceptual scheme. M also sees her fellow humans as belonging to 
one of two mutually exclusive categories: but her categories divide human beings into 
the good and the bad. Were C and M to engage in conversation on the topic of the two 
categories that human beings can fall into, they may be barely comprehensible to each 
other. However, the fact that neither assents to the other’s claims does not on its own 
imply that at least one of them must be wrong. For the difference between them may 
be wholly conceptual-scheme dependent.
18
 
 
 
IV 
 
Some presume, however, that to claim that religious entities are conceptual-scheme 
dependent makes internalist pluralism inherently atheistic. From the standpoint of 
Christianity, for example, the criticism would seem to be that the God worshipped by 
Christians is not appropriately classified as an object that only exists within a 
Christian conceptual scheme. Rather, according to Christianity, God is transcendent to 
all conceptual schemes. Because internalist pluralism would appear to be committed 
to the denial that such a conceptual-scheme transcendent God could exist, from a 
Christian perspective it may well seem indistinguishable from atheism. In other 
words, from a Christian point of view, internalist pluralism can appear to entail the 
                                                
17
Surely, no one would accuse a person who has learnt to use a fish chart of defining “trout”, “carp” 
and so on into existence. 
18
If such a difference were judged to be wholly conceptual scheme dependent, would that imply a form 
of relativism that would constitute a threat to pluralism? I have discussed this potential objection in 
“Internal Realism and the Problem of Religious Diversity”, op. cit. 
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straightforward denial that God exists.
19
 However, as I explain below, there is nothing 
to stop an adherent of internalist pluralism replying to this objection with the claim 
that the concept “transcendence” employed by the Christian is itself clearly 
conceptual-scheme dependent. For, surely, whatever it means for God to be 
transcendent to a conceptual scheme is itself determined by some conceptual scheme. 
Moreover, an adherent of internalist pluralism would only be an atheist in disguise 
if she were a metaphysical realist in disguise. For when an adherent of internalist 
pluralism states that (as in Figure 1) there are three objects according to the 
“Carnapian” conceptual scheme, and seven objects (as in Figure 2) according to the 
“Polish Logician’s” conceptual scheme, she is not claiming that, really, there aren’t 
any objects. Hence, why presume that an adherent of internalist pluralism must be 
committed to the claim that, really, there aren’t any religious entities? Only if one 
presupposes metaphysical realism would one find the “reality” of a conceptual-
scheme dependent God questionable.
20
 
In short, the first objection to internalist pluralism—that it is inherently atheistic—
only has bite if we presuppose metaphysical realism. But, obviously, one who 
subscribes to internalist pluralism does not share this presupposition. Internalist 
pluralism does indeed claim that God does not exist in the sense of existence 
subscribed to by a metaphysical realist about God, such as William Alston.
21
 But this 
is not enough to justify the charge that internalist pluralism is inherently biased 
towards atheism. Indeed, internalist pluralism regards the atheist’s claims to be no less 
conceptual-scheme dependent than are the claims of religious believers. 
Let us now turn to the other main objection to internalist pluralism: An atheist 
may well object that an adherent of internalist pluralism simply allows religious 
believers to define religious objects into existence and, in so doing, has undermined 
                                                
19
This appears to have been the understanding of the program board for a British Society for the 
Philosophy of Religion conference on religious pluralism. A talk on internalist pluralism was scheduled 
to take place in the “atheism” section of this conference.  
20
Admittedly, if theism is taken to presuppose metaphysical realism, then internalist pluralism is atheist 
at least in comparison to theism so construed. However, surely the claim that theism presupposes 
metaphysical realism simply begs the question of the most appropriate metaphysical framework within 
which to conceptualize theistic forms of religion. 
21
For an account of the form of metaphysical realism favored by Alston, see William P. Alston, A 
Sensible Metaphysical Realism (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 2002). 
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the possibility of meaningful debate between believers and non-believers.
22
 Curiously, 
religious exclusivists could raise a similar objection. They might claim that allowing 
religious believers to define religious objects into existence commits the adherent of 
internalist pluralism to accepting all the ontological claims made by religious 
believers within every religious tradition as on a par—and that would surely 
undermine the possibility of meaningful debate between members of different 
religious traditions.
23
 
Does internalist pluralism involve defining religious objects into existence, then? 
If so, it would provide cheap answers to important ontological questions, and thus 
would, in my view, rightly be regarded as an implausible theory by atheists and 
believers alike. In the following, I argue that internalist pluralism does not simply 
define religious objects into existence, and that it can, in fact, provide non-trivial 
answers to ontological questions.
24
 
 
 
V 
 
In order to ascertain whether or not internalist pluralism defines religious objects into 
existence, let me return to Putnam’s example of a world comprising three atoms. 
Because the “Polish Logician” is looking for mereological sums (for example, pairs, 
trios, and quadruples) as well as atoms, she sees a different world to that perceived by 
the “Carnapian” (who is only looking for atoms). For the “Carnapian”, only atoms are 
salient. But, for the “Polish Logician”, mereological sums are just as salient as atoms. 
Figure 1 represents how the “Carnapian” sees a world comprising three atoms, while 
                                                
22
This objection was raised by Franz-Peter Griesmaier in response to a paper given at the University of 
Wyoming in 2004. 
23
This criticism was suggested to me by Jim Cook. 
24
This objection may be in part motivated by the mistaken belief that internalist pluralism is committed 
to the view that all statements religious people make concerning their faith are true relative to the 
conceptual scheme of that faith. I have argued against this erroneous understanding of internalist 
pluralism in “Internal Realism and the Problem of Religious Diversity”, op. cit. However, if, contrary 
to fact, it were the case that all statements made about entities thought to exist within some religious 
conceptual scheme were true provided only that they were uttered by those subscribing to that 
conceptual scheme, that would indeed seem to lay internalist pluralism open to the charge of allowing 
entities to be defined into existence.  
 11
Figure 2 attempts to represents how the “Polish Logician” sees a world with the same 
number of atoms: namely, as a world comprising three atoms, three pairs, and one 
trio. 
Now, the differences between how those of different religious faiths conceptualize 
religious entities may well be analogous to the difference between Figure 1 and Figure 
2.
25
 The “Carnapian” and the “Polish Logician” do not agree on what is to be counted 
as an object, and followers of different faiths do not agree on what is to count as God 
or a God. So, consider the conceptual schemes employed by Muslims, Christians and 
Hindus.
26
 By comparing a world containing a tripartite God, angels and humans, with 
a world containing a non-tripartite God, angels and humans, when God, angels and 
humans are taken to comprise all the various targetable or countable agents, we can 
see how Muslims and Christians may easily see quite different worlds, for they view 
divine entities differently. If a world containing a tripartite God, angels and humans, 
is the world viewed by the Christian, and a world containing a non-tripartite God, 
angels and humans, is the world viewed by a Muslim, then the worlds of the Muslim 
and the Christian appear to differ in an analogous way to how the worlds of the 
“Carnapian” and the “Polish Logician” differ. So, while both traditional Muslims and 
traditional Christians agree that God may send instructions through angels, the 
Christian, unlike the Muslim, views God as a divine trinity that, mysteriously, is 
nevertheless a unity. If the Christian is correct in seeing a triune God, then should the 
Muslim fail to see such a God, that is not necessarily a mistake on her part. For the 
“Carnapian” is not making a mistake in seeing the world as in Figure 1 and failing to 
see the pairs and trio as in Figure 2. 
Moreover, both the Muslim and the Christian view divine entities differently to 
the Hindu. However, the difference between the Christian and the Hindu is not the 
                                                
25
The following discussion concerns the dispute between atheists and those who subscribe to various 
forms of theism. However, it should be clear that the theory outlined could be applied to other forms of 
religious conceptual scheme—including non-theistic ones. 
26
The following characterization of the “Christian” view and the “Hindu” view are not offered as 
accurate representations of what all Christians or all Hindus actually believe. Not all Christians 
subscribe to trinitarianism, just as not all Hindus accept a tripartite characterization of God. Both views 
are, however, relatively common. 
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same as the difference between the Christian and the Muslim.
27
 Like the Christian, the 
Hindu sees a world containing a tripartite God, angels and humans, and not a world 
containing a non-tripartite God, angels and humans. But the divine entities that the 
Hindu claims exist are not those that the Christian claims exist. For the Hindu regards 
the Absolute (God) as Brahman, who is projected as the Hindu trimutri of Brahma, 
Shiva, and Vishnu, and as many other Gods. But the members of the holy trinity, 
according to the Christian, are not projections. God the Father, for example, is God—
as are God the Son and God the Spirit. The Christian and the Hindu agree on the 
number of countable religious entities, but they disagree both on what those entities 
are and on their ontological status. 
But what of the difference between the atheist and the believer? This is not at all 
like the difference between the “Carnapian” and the “Polish Logician”. The atheist 
could insist that that she understands well enough the Muslim, Christian and Hindu 
conceptual schemes, and hence that she well understands what each of them considers 
to count as God or a God, but that there is no such object or objects to be counted. In 
other words, the difference between the believer and the atheist is not like the 
difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2, but rather like the difference between a 
world containing either a non-tripartite or a tripartite God, angels and humans, and a 
world containing only humans. 
Now, there might be thought to be a sense in which Hinduism defines Gods into 
existence, for, given a world containing a tripartite God, angels and humans, it is 
because of what Hindus count as a God that they see a world containing three Gods 
and not just one. There are clearly more Gods in the world arising from the Hindu 
conceptual scheme as opposed to the Islamic one, say. But there is a crucial sense in 
which conceptual schemes do not define religious entities into existence. For if, 
irrespective of which conceptual scheme is employed and what range of entities that 
                                                
27
But, a critic might object, why talk of adherents of different religious faiths employing different 
conceptual schemes rather than simply asserting that they disagree about conceptual-scheme 
independent facts? In response, if one rejects the analysis of religious belief systems in terms of 
conceptual schemes and hence rejects internalist pluralism, then one will require an alternative theory 
to address adequately the problems raised by religious diversity. I have argued elsewhere that 
internalist pluralism offers the best explanation of the diversity of religious belief and practice. See 
“Internal Realism and the Problem of Religious Diversity”, op. cit. 
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scheme deems targetable, only human agents are in fact successfully targeted, the 
substantive religious claims of Muslims, Christians and Hindus are false. So, 
regardless of one’s conceptual scheme, if, as a matter of fact, only humans are 
successfully targeted, then neither Islam nor Christianity nor Hinduism can succeed in 
defining religious entities into existence. Given a conceptual scheme that targets only 
human agents, the atheist is correct. But interestingly, given a conceptual scheme that 
targets a tripartite God, angels and humans or a conceptual scheme that targets a non-
tripartite God, angels and humans, Muslims, Christians and Hindus could all be 
asserting true statements about religious entities, even though they sound as if they are 
contradicting one another. Moreover, this implies that when Muslims and Christians 
denounce Hindus for worshiping false Gods, they may well be only false Gods within 
the Islamic and Christian conceptual schemes.
28
 They are not false Gods in the 
manner in which they would be were only human agents there to be counted, as in an 
atheist’s conceptual scheme. 
Hence, internalist pluralism entails neither that atheism is false nor that it is true. 
Either might be the case. It all depends upon whether or not the only agents 
successfully targeted by any conceptual scheme are human. However, internalist 
pluralism does entail that even if the claims of one religion are found to be true, the 
seemingly counter-claims of other religions may be equally true (that is, true within 
their respective conceptual schemes). Consequently, while internalist pluralism does 
not generate religious entities out of nothing, it does entail that the ontological claims 
made by members of all faith traditions should be taken equally seriously.
29
 No 
                                                
28
Similarly, statements made about W1 and W2 may appear contradictory even though they are not in 
fact contradictory if we take into account that they are governed by the conventions of different 
conceptual schemes. Put another way, the statements may not in fact be incompatible, even though the 
conceptual schemes are. One cannot simultaneously employ the conceptual schemes of the 
“Carnapian” and the “Polish Logician,” just as one cannot, on the account suggested above, 
consistently employ both the conceptual scheme of a Hindu and that of a Christian.  
29
It might be objected that one who subscribes to internalist pluralism would be committed to applying 
the theory at the meta-level, and thus regarding, for example, internalist pluralism and transcendental 
pluralism as incommensurable conceptual schemes to be taken equally seriously. If this were the case, 
internalist pluralism may well be deemed incoherent (as William Alston has argued with respect to 
internal realism), because it would seem to imply that conceptual schemes require analysis by meta-
conceptual schemes, which require analysis by meta-meta-conceptual schemes, and so on ad infinitum. 
However, internalist pluralism is a theory about conceptual schemes and the way that they relate to 
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ontological claim can be presumed to be false merely because it appears to contradict 
an ontological claim that is taken to be true within the context of another faith 
tradition. This is a conclusion which metaphysical realists have typically been keen to 
avoid.
30
 However, the ability to regard as possibly true the ontological claims made by 
adherents of a variety of faith traditions,
31
 even when these appear to contradict the 
ontological claims of one’s own conceptual scheme, would seem to be an advantage 
in a multicultural environment where members of diverse faith traditions, and those of 
none, often live side by side. 
I have indicated how those subscribing to different religious traditions could make 
different sounding statements about religious entities that were nevertheless true 
within each of their conceptual schemes. However, this is not to say that all 
differences between faiths are of this sort. For example, if a Muslim were to insist that 
it is not that she does not count a tripartite division within God as involving three 
divine entities, but that there is nothing tripartite about God at all, then this kind of 
disagreement between the Muslim and the Christian is more like the disagreement 
between the atheist and the believer. It is more like the “Polish Logician” saying that 
she understands the “Carnapian” way of counting objects, and on seeing the world of 
Figure 1, insists that when a “Carnapian” claims that there are three objects, then the 
“Carnapian” is simply mistaken.  
                                                                                                                                       
each other. While one could apply it at the meta-level, one does not have to. Thus, as I have argued at 
length elsewhere, internalist pluralism is not susceptible to this objection. See “Internal Realism and the 
Problem of Religious Diversity”, op. cit., pp. 298–300. For Alston’s criticism of internal realism, see 
Alston, A Sensible Metaphysical Realism, op. cit., pp. 32f. 
30
Keith Yandell, for example, points out that the central beliefs of major world religions such as 
Theravada Buddhism, Jainism, Advaita Vedanta Hinduism and Generic Philosophical Monotheism 
(which is an abstraction of Judaism, Christianity and Islam), all include ontological claims that 
contradict the ontological claims made by those within the other three traditions. He argues that if the 
ontological claims of any one of these traditions were proven to be true, that would entail the falsity of 
the central beliefs of the other three religious traditions. Internalist pluralism denies this entailment. See 
Keith E. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Perspective (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 
34. 
31
Presumably one could regard such claims as possibly true even while conceding that one’s ability to 
understand them might be limited by one’s ignorance of the conceptual scheme employed by the 
claimants. This is not to say that the ability to regard the ontological claims of different religious 
conceptual schemes as possibly true entails that one will regard all these claims as “live options” for 
oneself, given the conceptual scheme which one actually employs.  
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However, the difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2 merely concerns counting 
atoms, on the one hand, and counting atoms and mereological sums, on the other. The 
conceptual schemes that people actually employ are far, far richer; ranging over many 
different kinds of entities, including the religious, the aesthetic and the moral. And 
within each rich conceptual scheme all of the various components will interrelate and 
cohere in some complex way. Thus, translating from one conceptual scheme into 
another may, in practice, prove to be extremely difficult. And one new to a conceptual 
scheme may fail to see all features of the world that are evident to those with a long 
familiarity with that conceptual scheme (just as it is difficult for the novice to identify 
instances of all of the kinds of fish represented on a fish chart). All of this makes it 
very difficult for those within one conceptual scheme to be certain that the claims 
made by those within a different conceptual scheme are false. Surely, acknowledging 
this difficulty can sensitize one to the need to avoid dogmatism when forming 
judgments about the truth-value of beliefs held by members of faith traditions other 
than one’s own. 
 
 
VI 
 
I have argued that the adherent of internalist pluralism can deploy a distinction 
between conceptual-scheme targetability and successful conceptual-scheme targeting. 
In the religious domain, the question of conceptual-scheme targetability may well, at 
least at times, be what is at issue between those subscribing to different varieties of 
theism—and that disagreement concerns how the fundamental religious entity is to be 
construed. However, the question of successful conceptual-scheme targeting would 
seem to be what is at issue between the atheist and the religious believer—and this 
concerns whether there are any fundamental religious entities to be counted, given any 
of the available religious conceptual schemes.
32
 
                                                
32
A common criticism of Hickean transcendental pluralism is that it portrays morally motivated atheists 
as responding to the same ultimate religious reality as religious believers are thought to be responding 
to. This strikes many critics as highly implausible and also patronizing to atheists who, in effect, are 
being described by Hick as “anonymous theists”. Internalist pluralism’s account of atheists suffers from 
neither of these disadvantages. 
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However, as I briefly mentioned earlier, it might be argued that there is one 
variety of religious claim that could not possibly be conceptual-scheme dependent in 
any way: namely, all claims about God being transcendent to the world. For if a 
conceptual scheme determines what is to count within a world, then, it might be 
assumed, “God” must be conceptual-scheme independent in transcending the world. 
But, by way of response, what would count as a transcendent God may differ from 
one religious tradition to another. In other words, what it means to transcend the 
world and what it means to be a God that does so is no less conceptual-scheme 
dependent than any other claim. Put another way, claims about God’s transcendence 
are no less made within a conceptual scheme than are the divergent claims of the 
“Carnapian” and the “Polish Logician”. As such, there is a sense in which a 
transcendent God is within the “world” of a conceptual scheme. 
But is it not paradoxical to state that a God that is transcendent to the world is 
nevertheless within the world? The paradox is only apparent, for, clearly, there are 
two senses of “world” that need to be distinguished: a narrow sense, where what is 
meant by “world” is such that God transcends it; and a wider sense, where everything 
that can be talked about, including a transcendent God, is within it. But then, given the 
latter sense of “world”, when an adherent of one faith makes claims about a 
transcendent God that appear to contradict claims about such a God made by the 
adherents of another faith, then the disagreement could be analogous to that of the 
“Carnapian” and the “Polish Logician”. While it sounds as if the “Carnapian” and the 
“Polish Logician” are contradicting each other when one counts three objects and the 
other denies that there are only three and insists that there are seven, instead, the 
contradiction is only apparent. For they are not talking about the same things. The 
same could be the case with divergent-sounding claims about a transcendent God. 
Hence, a believer’s citing the transcendent nature of her God provides, on its own, no 
excuse for her showing intolerance to the claims made by those adhering to a different 
faith. 
In short, if differences between the claims of religious belief systems are of the 
wholly conceptual-scheme dependent variety, this would constitute strong grounds for 
religious toleration. This is because, presuming that the claims comprising the belief 
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systems of the major world religions are equally internally coherent,
33
 there would 
seem to be no compelling justification for preferring one religion rather than 
another.
34
 And while internalist pluralism provides a theory that can underwrite the 
appropriateness of believers showing toleration to those of different faiths, it would 
not seem to close the debate between religious believers and atheists. This latter 
debate must take place across a variety of fields of human knowledge: not only 
philosophy, theology, and religious studies, but also anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, and even the natural sciences.
35
 Pending a clear outcome, internalist 
pluralism counsels believer and atheist alike to adopt a stance of mutual toleration.
36
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This presumption has been ably defended in John Hick, “On Grading Religions”, Religious Studies 
17, 4 (1981): 451–467, and in Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Issues in Contemporary Judaism (London: 
Macmillan, 1991). 
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While there may be no justification for preferring one religion to another that is internal to the 
religious conceptual schemes themselves, this is not to deny that there may be other, more practical, 
reasons in favor of commitment to one religion rather than another. 
35
Needless to say, this list is not exhaustive. 
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Tolerance, of course, may be insufficient as a starting point for inter-faith dialogue. See Perry 
Schmidt-Leukel, “Beyond tolerance: towards a new step in interreligious relationships”, Scottish 
Journal of Theology 55 (2002): 379-391. 
